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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment is a brief response to Professor David Crump's interest-
ing article, "Murder, Pennsylvania Style": Comparing Traditional American
Homicide Law to the Status of Mode Penal Code Jurisdictions, in this issue of
the West Virginia Law Review. My purpose is not to express each quibble I
have with Professor Crump's piece but rather to discuss some larger issues
raised by Professor Crump's work. Indeed, I agree with many of Professor
Crump's conclusions,' particularly those faulting the Pennsylvania model for its
imprecision.
In general terms, Professor Crump, as is typical of his scholarship, has
addressed an interesting issue, made many insightful points, and offered some
* B.A. Yale; J.D. Vanderbilt; LL.M. Harvard; Diploma in Criminology, Cambridge (U.K.).
Visiting Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School; retired Distinguished Service Professor of
Law and W.P. Tom's Professor of Law, the University of Tennessee College of Law.
I Among the sound suggestions Professor Crump makes are: putting the burden of proof of
"heat of passion" or the like on the defendant on the theory that he or she possesses the informa-
tion needed by the jury to assess this (though I am concerned that it forces the accused to admit
killing the victim); that "malice aforethought" should be abolished as a named concept because it
is such a misnomer and can be replaced by a definition that accurately describes its meaning; and
that premeditating "in an instant" seems to be inconsistent with the real meaning of that term,
requiring some kind of advance planning.
1
Cohen: Thoughts on Professor Crump's Comparison of Traditional American
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
bold, specific solutions to the problems he identifies.2 One cannot help but learn
any time Professor Crump takes pen in hand or, more accurately, keyboard to
fingers.
Professor Crump's choice of a topic recognizes a significant issue for
anyone interested in substantive criminal law, especially the law of homicide.
Quite correctly, he notes that the two prevalent American models of homicide
are the Model Penal Code (MPC) and the Pennsylvania Statute of 1794. The
concept of comparing them as they are applied by the various states is most in-
formative and worthwhile. His conclusion that the MPC model is far better than
the Pennsylvania approach is, in my opinion, quite sound. However, perhaps as
applied, the two do not function as differently as Professor Crump opines.
Moreover, while I strongly agree with Professor Crump that the Pennsylvania
approach does create muddled categories and needs significant clarification, I do
not agree that the Pennsylvania approach, as applied, is necessarily an irrational
way to organize the law of homicide.
This Comment examines Professor Crump's considerable piece from
several perspectives. After suggesting that Professor Crump's analysis would
benefit from a broader look at the American jurisdictions adopting the Pennsyl-
vania or MPC approach to homicide, it turns to the critical issue of assessing
relative moral blameworthiness, which is at the heart of Professor Crump's cri-
tique of the Pennsylvania model. This Comment then discusses whether, in fact,
the Pennsylvania model is actually so complex and poorly articulated that it
produces unacceptable results. To better ensure that the Pennsylvania-based
homicide provisions actually serve their underlying policies, this Comment sug-
gests that better legislative history and jury instructions would be a helpful
complement. Moreover, an accurate assessment of the Pennsylvania and MPC
models will require far better empirical data about how they work in practice.
Finally, this Comment argues that merely changing decision makers to allow the
judge, rather than jury, to fine-tune homicide law by differential sentencing
based on differences in moral blameworthiness will not, in my view, produce
results that better reflect the community's assessment of moral blameworthi-
ness.
11. INCOMPLETE SURVEY OF Two SYSTEMS
One problem with this piece is that it does not paint with as broad a
brush as it might. Professor Crump focuses primarily on the homicide laws of
California and Texas and leaves developments in the rest of the country largely
untouched or relegated to a few references in the footnotes. Indeed, at some
points, especially in the latter pages of the article, one gets the impression that
the point of the article is to critique California homicide law by pointing out its
2 My favorite is David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doc-
trine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 359 (1985), where he forcefully argues in favor of the felony
murder rule, contrary to the vast weight of academic scholarship.
[Vol. 109
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significant faults that would be virtually eliminated if it were more like that of
Texas. 3 While in many ways this observation is accurate, it does little to provide
a general study of either the Model Penal Code or the Pennsylvania approach
because many of the details Professor Crump addresses in the two statutes were
not part of either the MPC or the Pennsylvania homicide laws. These specific
provisions were added by the California or Texas legislature or courts, some-
times-but not always-in response to deficiencies in the MPC or Pennsylvania
statutes.4 Another window into the Pennsylvania and Model Penal Code provi-
sions could be opened if developments in many other states were also addressed.
Indeed, developments in Pennsylvania since 1794 might be helpful 5 because
Pennsylvania used its extensive experience with its own homicide structure to
conclude that significant changes were needed. Surely the statutes and case law
in those states may contain instructive illustrations of good and bad develop-
ments in the etiology of these two approaches to homicide law and may reveal
that the Pennsylvania model as applied is not as deficient as portrayed by Pro-
fessor Crump.
Ill. CONUNDRUM OF "MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS"
Another issue that bears mention is the elusive concept of moral
blameworthiness. Professor Crump frequently notes that a part of the California
or Pennsylvania statute does not accurately reflect the killer's moral blamewor-
3 Professor Crump states that the homicide law of Texas is preferable to that of California "in
virtually every respect in which it differs." David Crump, "Murder, Pennsylvania Style": Com-
paring Traditional American Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions,
109 W. VA. L. REv. 257 (2007).
4 For example, Professor Crump criticizes California first degree murder law for including
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to kill someone outside the vehicle.
Crump, supra note 3, at 291-292; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 2005). He argues that this does
not correlate with moral blameworthiness because first degree murder covers a person who is
shooting from inside a car but does not cover a person who is sitting on a curb, waiting for a ride,
and impulsively intentionally shoots someone on the street. While it seems to me appropriate for
the California legislature to say that shooting from a car merits special harsh treatment, perhaps
because of a rash of such crimes or the difficulty of apprehending drive-by killers, Professor
Crump's disagreement with this policy choice is just that-his personal values, which differ from
those of California legislators. More importantly for present purposes, it must be noted that Pro-
fessor Crump's concerns about the issue do not really address the Pennsylvania model since this
category of first degree murder was never part of the Pennsylvania law but rather was added by
California legislative authorities addressing a California-specific concern. The same issue would
be presented under the Model Penal Code if the legislature, expressing local values, somehow
made homicide committed by a drive-by shooting an aggravating factor, meriting harsher punish-
ment.
5 The California courts have looked to Pennsylvania precedents when interpreting language in
the early Pennsylvania statute. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1970)
(in interpreting the phrase "human being" in California homicide law, the California Supreme
Court looked at a 1797 Pennsylvania case, indicating that a "human being" for this purpose must
have been "born alive").
2007]
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thiness. At the heart of this issue, of course, is the notion that homicide law
should permit actors to be sorted according to their moral blameworthiness.
After all, the reasoning goes, each person charged with a homicide has killed
someone.6 The issue is what to do with this killer. Should he or she be assigned
to the most serious group of killers, meriting the most serious punishment, or to
a lesser group, qualifying at most for some lesser sanction?
A simple illustration is the hired killer who uses a car to kill the in-
tended victim who is crossing the street. The contrasting illustration is the
driver who does not see a pedestrian crossing the street and accidentally kills
that person. In both the hired killer and careless driver cases, the defendant-
driver operates a car in such a way as to kill the victim, but generally accepted
moral theory says the two should be treated differently by the criminal law. The
hired killer "deserves" greater punishment than the careless driver because kill-
ing intentionally is morally worse than killing carelessly, even though it might
not matter to the victim's family whether the defendant killed purposely or care-
lessly. Sentencing law in every jurisdiction recognizes this and authorizes far
greater punishment for the intentional killer than for the criminally negligent
one.
Professor Crump, correctly in my view, recognizes this fundamental
concept in criminal law but, like so many of us, does not have any overall theory
of weighing or even assessing moral blameworthiness. The matter is presented
as an ipse dixit based on the author's gut feeling about what is more blamewor-
thy and therefore deserving of greater punishment. It would have been interest-
ing to have seen an effort to systematically deal with the idea that moral blame-
worthiness should be more than a gut assessment of gravity.7
Of course, one could argue that scaling moral blameworthiness is ex-
actly what homicide law is all about and exactly what each jurisdiction has done
in deciding what conduct to include in each level of homicide and what sanction
to authorize for that conduct. In other words, when a legislature decides to in-
clude drive-by killings in its definition of first degree murder, it is making a
judgment about moral blameworthiness in that jurisdiction.
A good illustration is provided by the general statement that killing
someone should be considered more morally blameworthy than stealing a valu-
6 Thus, the analysis is different from that involving the relative moral blameworthiness of
murderers versus attempted murderers. See, e.g., Russell Christopher, Does Attempted Murder
Deserve Greater Punishment Than Murder? Moral Luck and the Duty to Prevent Harm, 18
NOTRE DAME J.L.ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 419 (2004).
7 A good illustration of an effort to treat moral blameworthiness systematically is found in
Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes Trans-
ferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 261 (2004). I am sympathetic to
arguments against getting too theoretical in analyzing legal issues, especially by state legislators
who are simply responding to a local concern and do not have the background or interest to tackle
incredibly difficult issues of moral philosophy. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE
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able necklace. After all, our gut tells us that life is surely a predominant value
in our society and should be so rated in the criminal law. The problem is that
this generalization is not followed in many jurisdictions. In some locales, for
example, killing someone accidentally (perhaps categorized as involuntary man-
slaughter or criminally negligent homicide) carries less of a punishment than
stealing a valuable item.8 In other words, if sentence categories reflect moral
blameworthiness, some jurisdictions simply do not rate taking human life as
graver than stealing an expensive piece of jewelry.
While many of us may disagree with this assessment of relative gravity,
we must remember that this process of deciding the relative gravity of crimes is
essentially a political decision. In our system of criminal justice, often this de-
cision is made by the legislature with little judicial oversight.9 This means that
irrespective of what any academic thinks, in that jurisdiction the political proc-
ess has created a structure in which theft of a high-end car is viewed as more
morally blameworthy than a careless killing of a human being. While one could
easily disagree with this conclusion, one must remember that it is a political
decision rather than a necessary product of either the MPC or the Pennsylvania
model. Thus, when Professor Crump opines that a particular statutory provision
has improperly assessed relative moral blameworthiness, one must remember
that this critical assessment is subject to considerable disagreement by people
actually charged with representing community values in scaling the moral
blameworthiness of various means of killing someone. 10
A better illustration is Professor Crump's view that the Pennsylvania
model's focus on premeditation and deliberation chooses "mens rea as the sole
determinant of the most serious grade of murder, and a particular defined mens
rea at that," and thus "creates an artificial standard that prevents crime grading
from correlating with offense severity."" Although I share Professor Crump's
view that the premeditation-deliberation formula presents problems in outer-
limit cases, I cannot quarrel with a legislature that votes to make planned, cool
killings the most serious variety of homicide, possibly even meriting the death
penalty. To me this seems to be a rational view of moral blameworthiness. A
legislature choosing this value structure, in my view, is neither irresponsible nor
8 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.05, 12:35 (Vernon 2005) (criminally negligent
homicide is a state jail felony punishable by jail confinement of 180 days to two years; §§
31.03(e)(6), 12.33 (1974) (theft of item valued at $100,000 to less than $200,000 is second degree
felony punishable by not less than two nor more than twenty years).
9 See, e.g., Keeler, 470 P.2d at 624 (subject to limitations on cruel and unusual punishment,
"the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch").
10 A fascinating example is provided by Texas law, reflecting the state's history and values.
Stealing ten or more head of cattle during a single transaction is a felony of the third degree carry-
ing a penalty of not less than two or more than ten years, while negligent homicide carries a
maximum sentence of two years. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(e)(5)(A), 12.34, 12.35, 19.05
(Vernon 2005). In other words, the minimum sentence for stealing ten head of cattle is the same
as the maximum sentence authorized for negligent homicide.
I See Crump, supra note 3, at 275.
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driven by values far from the mainstream of Americans.' 2 Thus, I disagree with
Professor Crump's statement that a thoughtless, senseless, frenzied, and bizarre
homicide should not be valued less severely than a deliberate, premeditated kill-
ing. In my mind, there is a meaningful moral difference, and differential treat-
ment is not inappropriate. The Pennsylvania model's decision to recognize this
difference is quite defensible.
I also see a qualitative difference between premeditation-deliberation
and intent. While Professor Crump would be comfortable with using intentional
killing as a definition for murder, he concedes that there still must be distinc-
tions in sentencing because not all intentional killings are the same. I agree, but
I think that a deliberate, premeditated one deserves aggravated punishment, as
recognized by the Pennsylvania homicide provision.
IV. Too COMPLICATED FOR REASONABLE RESULTS?
Another issue is that of whether the Pennsylvania model is so general
and so complicated that it invites juries to use their own values rather than those
prescribed by the criminal law. One underlying concern is that the juries will
discriminate against people in certain ethnic or economic groups. Professor
Crump, for example, notes that the Pennsylvania model's focus on premedita-
tion may cause imprecise jury instructions that provide the jury with little guid-
ance. He cites the classic study by Kalven and Zeisel13 for the proposition that
jurors conscientiously attempt to follow the judge's instructions. From this, he
infers that the jury will (1) receive jury instructions that are too vague, (2) try to
follow those instructions, and (3) make arbitrary decisions in at least some
cases. While I do not disagree with any of these statements, I am reminded that
Kalven and Zeisel themselves actually concluded that juries usually make the
same decision as the judge would have made. 14 In other words, irrespective of
the legitimate critique of jury instructions, juries-somehow-usually get it right.
It is interesting that Professor Crump actually cites very few cases illus-
trating how states following the Pennsylvania model produce bizarre or even
inconsistent results. He relies primarily on the famous California case of People
v. Anderson and argues that the court resolved the case in a manner that did not
accurately reflect the moral blameworthiness of the defendant. While of course
one could easily disagree with Anderson, as have some subsequent California
12 Indeed, this seems to be the California legislature's exact approach that was seemingly
endorsed in the much-maligned People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 948 (Cal. 1968) (willful, de-
liberate, and premeditated killing is only proper if the slayer killed as result of careful thought and
weighing of consideration, as a deliberate judgment or plan, carried out coolly and steadily ac-
cording to a preconceived design).
13 HARRY A. KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (Little, Brown, & Co. (Canada)
Limited 1966).
14 Id. at 429-430 (judge thought jury decision was "without merit" in nine percent of cases;
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courts, Professor Crump does not provide us with many other illustrations of
how a Pennsylvania model does-or is likely to-have a wrong result. One reason
for this lack of authority is that, in reality, states with a Pennsylvania model may
well not produce anomalous results with any frequency.
As proof for this admittedly speculative proposition, I note how few
cases of such anomalies are cited by the anti-Pennsylvania scholars and how
many legislatures have stuck with the Pennsylvania model after many years of
seeing it in action. 15 If the model works so poorly, in a heavily charged political
atmosphere of a state legislature, where the actors face election regularly, one
would expect there to have been many changes as perceived injustices in well-
publicized cases are dealt with by new legislation.
By way of contrast, many other areas of laws have undergone signifi-
cant change when legislatures have perceived a problem with the existing
schema. Recent examples include criminal laws dealing with child abuse,
methamphetamines, and drunk driving. If the homicide laws are not being
changed, this may well indicate that, to those who actually use them, they seem
to work just fine, despite some theoretical problems spotted by academics.
A terrific example is the death penalty. Many jurisdictions have altered
their list of aggravating circumstances in response to particular situations where
legislators think that a certain category of offenders should be made eligible for
the death penalty in order to recognize their moral blameworthiness. If the sub-
stantive Pennsylvania-type homicide laws are not being fine-tuned this way,
perhaps it is because they adequately recognize the jurisdiction's concepts of
relative moral blameworthiness and, as applied, produce sensible results.
V. How ABOUT MEANINGFUL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY?
Courts faced with the daunting task of interpreting statutes like those us-
ing Pennsylvania-type terms, such as "premeditation" and "deliberation," would
be well-served if legislators enacting such laws would make sure there is ade-
quate legislative history that sketches, at least with a broad brush, what conduct
is to be covered.
One could imagine two types of legislative history. One might be rather
precise, clearly spelling out the type of killer to be included in a particular cate-
gory. Another variety might be far more general, making it clear that the jury is
to be given some leeway in assessing a case. The meaning of premeditation or
deliberation could be included in the former, more precise category. Perhaps
''extreme emotional disturbance" or even "heat of passion" could be in the latter
category, giving jurors significant leeway in assessing moral blameworthiness.
This approach to legislative history would have many advantages. It
would not only force legislators to think critically about the categories they cre-
ate, it would also provide guidance for the preparation of jury instructions and
15 Professor Crump acknowledges this in stating that the thesis of his article is that the Penn-
sylvania approach poorly defines crime but has "surprising staying power."
2007]
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for courts interpreting the laws. This, in turn, may more properly assign respon-
sibility between the legislature, courts, and juries. In my view, the legislature
should make the fundamental decisions about scaling moral blameworthiness.
Appellate courts should try to follow that guidance rather than supply its own
measure. Juries should also follow that guidance, which in some instances
would be expressed in rather general terms that invite the jury to apply commu-
nity values, much as the death penalty sentencing structure does in the ultimate
decision whether the defendant should receive the death penalty or a lesser sanc-
tion.
Professor Crump's observation that deliberation-premeditation may be
confused with intent under the Pennsylvania model is an excellent example of
concepts that could easily be distinguished by decent legislative history. It
would not be difficult for a legislature to indicate clearly that its deliberation-
premeditation formula is not the same as mere intent. Indeed, my understanding
of the Pennsylvania approach is that intent and premeditation-deliberation over-
lap but are not the same, and only the latter fits the extreme moral blameworthi-
ness test appropriate for first degree murder. The fact that some jurisdictions
may confuse these rather different concepts does not mean that the concepts are
faulty, but rather that the means of articulating them need improvement. Clear
legislative history may provide an appropriate vehicle for ensuring state policy
is known and followed.
VI. THE FORGOTTEN CURE: BETTER JURY INSTRUCTIONS?
Professor Crump accurately points out how confusing some of the
Pennsylvania-based concepts have become. Does it make sense to say that first
degree murder requires premeditation, but one can premeditate in an instant? A
far better approach would be to recognize what the fundamental concept behind
deliberation is and to have judges who honor this and juries that apply it. As
suggested above, crystal-clear legislative history may assist in having the law
interpreted in a way that is consistent with its basic purpose.
Indeed, would it even be possible for the legislature to draft jury instruc-
tions for use in such cases? I know many people would question whether the
legislative process is appropriate for this function, but perhaps combining the
drafting statutes and the implementing jury instructions would produce worka-
ble products consistent with the intent of the legislature. Wouldn't it be interest-
ing if this were tried on a small, experiential basis?
VII. EMPIRICAL DATA WOULD HELP
Professor Crump's work, like that of just about everyone else analyzing
criminal law, tries to deal with reality-what actually happens. Many fundamen-
tal conclusions are bottomed on a view of what really goes on inside a jury
room. For example, Professor Crump characterizes a jury as not understanding
some jury instructions, possibly acting on improper motives, and sometimes
reaching a wrong result. He even suggests that the "[invidious] values of the
[Vol. 109
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people of the State are more likely to be carried out in the grading of the State's
most serious crimes." 16
The problem is that each of these conclusions is subject to empirical
verification and, in my view, rarely based on accurate information about the law
as applied. One reason for my skepticism is my own completely unscientific
observations of trials, in many locales, and conversations with countless crimi-
nal trial lawyers. As a general rule, I have rarely seen a jury that is way off base
in its conclusions. Similarly, virtually all the trial lawyers I have informally
interviewed conclude that juries actually do understand the facts and somehow-
despite data showing juries sometimes simply do not understand their jury in-
structions-make sensible decisions, resolving conflicting evidence in a way that
is consistent with the evidence and the spirit of the applicable laws.
This possibility is illustrated by Professor Crump's observation that un-
der the Pennsylvania model, a mercy killing, which may be characterized as
deliberate and premeditated, could be treated as first degree murder and there-
fore more seriously than more blameworthy homicides. Of course, this could
happen, but Professor Crump cites no cases suggesting that it actually does hap-
pen, and my hunch is that it simply does not. If a jury actually believes that the
killing was a mercy killing, as opposed to, say, one designed to let the killer
inherit from the victim, I have a hard time believing that a jury would actually
convict the defendant of first degree murder (or even that a prosecutor would
charge this crime).
What is needed is a serious, comprehensive study of what actually hap-
pens in criminal trials. For example, do jurors collectively understand the issues
and the evidence? Do they follow jury instructions?17 Do they make sensible
decisions? Do they discriminate against the poor, certain ethnic groups, and the
like? While obtaining answers to these questions may be difficult and perhaps
even impossible, the data would go far in helping us understand what is actually
broken and needs to be fixed in the American criminal justice system. 
18
16 See Crump, supra note 3, at 300.
17 Though the studies are in conflict, a very recent one concluded that, in homicide cases,
where the jury could choose either murder or manslaughter based on defendant's emotion-driven
behavior, jury instructions describing manslaughter in terms of subjective or objective standards
did not significantly affect the outcome. The authors conclude that the jurors interpreted the in-
structions to fit their pre-instruction understanding of the distinctions between murder and man-
slaughter. Jurors also based their decision on factors about the defendant's emotional history.
Matthew Spackman et al., An Analysis of the Effects of Subjective and Objective Instruction
Forms on Mock-Juries Murder/Manslaughter Distinctions, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 605, 605
(2002).
18 One of Professor Crump's points bears special mention. In arguing against the Pennsyl-
vania deliberation-premeditation formula, he suggests that somehow the Pennsylvania pattern
"has created a climate in which millions of dollars' worth of scarce criminal justice resources are
spent on nothing of value, when they could be spent on victim compensation" and the like. See
Crump, supra note 3, at 291. I have strong reservations that this is accurate and that the elimina-
tion of the deliberation-formula would result in less expensive judicial proceedings. For example,
I question whether there would actually be fewer appeals if the premeditation approach were
2007]
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VIII. DIFFERENT RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT DECISION MAKERS?
Professor Crump seems to suggest that altering the structure of homi-
cide law, such as by having degrees of moral blameworthiness assessed at sen-
tencing rather than in the definition of crime, would produce superior results.
Although I can see many merits in this procedure, I wonder whether this would
actually produce better results. My hunch-again not informed by any empirical
data-is that the results would not be much different in the two approaches. I
suspect that the jury takes moral blameworthiness into consideration routinely in
deciding whether someone acted with a depraved heart for second degree, Penn-
sylvania-type murder or criminal negligence for Pennsylvania-type involuntary
manslaughter. The same is true for the premeditation-deliberation application
for first degree murder versus the extreme passion assessment needed for volun-
tary manslaughter. Empirical research on this issue would be quite instructive.
Moreover, as Professor Crump notes, changing an assessment of moral
blameworthiness from the guilt phase to the sentencing phase may result in a
change of decision makers; the jury assesses guilt, and the judge assigns the
sentence. Professor Crump is comfortable with having the judge decide these
moral blameworthiness issues. I, on the other hand, feel quite comfortable with
the jury deciding issues such as the defendant's mental state at the time of the
act or the amount of suffering the victim endured.
IX. CHANGE STILL A GOOD IDEA
Despite my own reservations about a few of Professor Crump's conclu-
sions, I agree with him that the Pennsylvania model of homicide needs consid-
erable work to make it clearly serve its purposes. Thus, clear jury instructions,
legislative history, and appellate decisions that reflect the conceptual heart of
the model make sense, even if they do not produce many changes in outcomes.
It is important that the law maintain its legitimacy. Well-written, clearly articu-
lated rules serve this purpose far better than muddled ones, even if by some odd
mechanism the results of the two differ only slightly. Of course, absent good
empirical data, we do not really know how or even whether the two models ac-
tually produce different results as applied.
Professor Crump has done us a good turn by pointing out a litany of
problems with the Pennsylvania-California model, suggesting improvements,
replaced by an intent one with the sentencing system playing a large role in assessing moral
blameworthiness. Or would counsel simply appeal both intent and sentence issues rather than
premeditation-deliberation issues? One more related point. To some extent Professor Crump's
argument is that the confusion of Anderson and its progeny are responsible for the added appellate
costs, but of course this is a critique of the California cases rather than the Pennsylvania model
itself. Anderson is not a necessary result of the Pennsylvania approach, despite the inherent ambi-
guities in using premeditation and deliberation as key ingredients for first degree murder.
[Vol. 109
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and generally making us more aware of the complex values underlying Ameri-
can homicide law.
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